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Abstract-The simulation approach to policy analysis usually concentrates on policy multipliers as a 
measure of the thrust of economic policy. However, this measure is inadequate for one branch of economic 
policy, namely, fiscal policy. The reason is that the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends, via the government 
budget constraint, on the method of finance. It is argued in this paper that for this very reason the 
conventional way of calculating simulation-based dynamic multipliers introduces a bias towards the no- 
crowding-out thesis. This bias arises even in models of monetarist persuasion. Furthermore, it is shown 
that this bias can be removed by utilizing multipliers based on optimal control. We illustrate this 
proposition by providing numerical results using a large-scale U.K. econometric model of international 
monetarist persuasion (the London Business School model, LBS). Section 1 builds up a framework through 
which policy optimization can be compared and evaluated to policy simulations. In Section 2 we derive 
and compare policy multipliers obtained through policy simulations and optimal control. Section 3 
provides a numerical example with the findings being summarized in Section 4. 
I. OPTIMAL CONTROL AND POLICY SIMULATIONS 
Policymaking in a control framework can be regarded as the problem of the simultaneous 
determination of the optimal paths of a vector of controls (instruments) over a given time horizon 
to achieve the optimal value of an objective (or loss) function. The latter reflects the policymaker’s 
choice about controls and targets. In principle, the policymaker can freely choose the range of 
targets and their relative importance and the controls and their costs of adjustment. 
The objective function can be represented in general terms as 
J(Y, W (1) 
where Y denotes the vector of endogenous variables 
Y E [y’( I), . . . , y’(t). . . , y’(T)]’ 
with y(t) denoting the vector of endogenous variables at time t, 1 < t < T. U is the vector of 
controls written in the same form as definition (2). 
The constraint in minimizing function (1) is the econometric model which is taken as the best- 
available representation of the way the economy works. In the deterministic case, the model is 
written in stacked form: 
F(Y, U, X) = 0, (3) 
where X denotes the vector of exogenous variables written in the same form as definition (2). 
Thus the policymaking problem in the deterministic case is considered to be 
min {J(Y, U) 1 F(Y, U, X) = 0}, (4) 
where the symbol 1 stands for “subject to”. 
105 
106 P. ARESTIS and E. KARAKITSOS 
For a quadratic objective functiont and a linear model, the design of economic policy 
from 
min{ +[(Y - Yd)‘Q,(Y - Yd) + (U - Ud)‘Q,(U - Ud)] ) Y = AU + BX}, 
follows 
(5) 
where Q, and Q, are symmetric matrices of penalty weights with Q,, positive semidefinite and Q, 
positive definite and superscript d denotes desired values. The optimal policy is given from the 
first-order necessary condition: of the constrained optimization problem (5): 
u* = [A’Q,A + o,]- ‘[QUd + A’&Yd - A’Q,BX] (6) 
for given values of Q,, Q., Yd and Ud. The effect of this policy on the vector of endogenous variables 
is obtained by substituting equation (6) in the model 
Y* = A[A’O,A + Q] - ’ [Q,Ud + A’Q,Yd] + [B - A[A’Q,A + Q,] - ‘A’QJ3]X. (7) 
It is obvious from equations (6) and (7) that the optimal policy depends on the specification of 
the objective function; in particular, the penalty matrices Q, and Q, and the desired paths of the 
targets, Yd, and controls, Ud. In addition, the optimal policy depends on the matrix of policy 
multipliers, A, and the values of the exogenous variables, X. 
In policy analysis based on the “simulation” approach, one chooses the value of U from an 
implicit objective function, U’, and then computes the corresponding Y through the model 
Y” = AU’ + BX. (8) 
If the initial choice of Us has an undesirable effect on Y, then another value for the U vector is 
assumed and the effect on Y is recalculated. In this sense, policy simulations can be considered as 
a simple optimization problem of minimizing an objective function, comprising of preferences only 
for the control vector and not for the target vector, subject to the econometric model. In this 
context, policy simulations can be thought of as a special case of policy optimization. This can be 
proved by showing that the simulation of the econometric model given Us is equivalent to solving 
the simple optimization problem@ 
min(J,(U) 1 F(Y, U, X) = 0}, (9) 
where J,(U) is a function only of U with a unique minimum at Us. The optimality conditions can 
be obtained from the Lagrangian 
L(Y, U. 1) = J,(U) + F’(Y, U, X)A, (10) 
where 12 is the vector of Lagrange multipliers. Hence, 
i?L dJ 
__=-A 
(7u c’u 
+ dF’i.=o 
[ 1 au ’ 
CL dF ’ _= _ 
(7Y [ 1 i?Y A=o 
(11) 
(12) 
tThere arc a number of well-known IImitatlons of a quadratic objective function. The most important one is that it 
treats positive and negative deviations of actual from desired values as equally important. This need not be a serious 
problem. though, because the objective function can be respccified using the method suggested by Rustem er al. [l] to 
make sure that only unfavourable deviations are penalized. In expression (5) discounting is absent which implies that 
current and future values are of equal importance. Nevertheless, for the finance problem analysed here, discounting should 
not be introduced for otherwise the finance problem would be distorted. See, however. the works by Theil [Z], Livesey [3] 
and Chow [4], who provide arguments in support of a quadratic objective function. 
$ Sufficient conditions require evaluation of second-order derivatives. For large-scale models these are difficult and very 
expensive to compute. The interested reader is referred to Rustem [S] for the ways in which sufficient conditions can be 
incorporated. 
$The analysis here follows closely that in Refs [5,6]. 
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and 
Since equation (13) implies that 
F(Y, U, X) = 0. 
it follows from equation (11) that 
which, in view of equation (12), reduces to 
!!A!=() 
au 3 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
the condition for the unconstrained minimum of problem (9). 
Thus, the optimality conditions of problem (9) are reduced to solving equations (15) and (13) 
simultaneously. These conditions imply the calculation of the value of U, say U”, through equation 
(15), which minimizes the unconstrained function J,, and then the use of that value to compute the 
corresponding Y through the model (13). But this is exactly what we do in policy simulations; we 
choose the value of U (from an implicit objective function) and then compute the corresponding 
Y through the model. Therefore, since problem (9) is a special case of problem (4), policy simulations 
can be considered as a special case of policy optimization in which only controls but not targets 
are included in the objective function. 
The thrust of economic policy is judged through the matrix of policy multipliers, A, in policy 
simulations, whereas it is judged by the reduction in total cost, AJ, in policy optimization. The 
latter provides a multidimensional picture for it shows how much conflicting and complementary 
targets have been achieved in relation to their cost (i.e. instrument variation). However, the thrust 
of fiscal policy is related to the method of financing government spending which, in turn, relates 
closely to the discussion of the government budget constraint [7-l I]. This constraint specifies that 
the total flow of government expenditure must equal the total flow of financing from all sources. 
The total flow of financing includes taxes, net government borrowing from the public and the net 
amount of new money issued. Budget deficits or surpluses alter the size of public debt, and the 
method of financing such deficits or disposing of such surpluses affects the composition of private 
wealth. Hence any discussion of the effects of fiscal policy actions should distinguish the different 
monetary repercussions that result from such alternative modes of financing budget deficits or 
disposing of budget surpluses. It is for this very reason that in what follows we sharply distinguish 
between two alternatives: financing an increase in government expenditure through (i) money 
creation and (ii) bond issuance.? We, therefore, account quite clearly for the existence of the 
Government Budget Constraint for neglect of it would result in introducing a bias in the effect of 
fiscal policy and therefore of both the short- and long-term multipliers [7,8]. 
The extent to which fiscal policy matters, taking into account the finance repercussions, can be 
examined by postulating the following crowding-out coefficient in scalar form: 
t The tax-financed case can be tackled in exactly the same manner and it need not concern us here. 
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where K, and K, are the government expenditure multipliers under pure bond and money finance, 
respectively. Clearly, the C-coefficient varies between zero and unity, 0 d C d 1. When fiscal policy 
is very effective, bond finance would be as good as money finance (i.e. K, = KM). In this case there 
is no crowding-out and the C-coefficient would be zero. On the other hand, if fiscal policy is 
completely ineffective, the bond finance multipliers would be zero, K, = 0. In this case there would 
be complete crowding-out and the C-coefficient would be unity. 
2. DERIVATION OF POLICY MULTIPLIERS USING OPTIMAL CONTROL 
In this section we show how “policy multipliers” can be derived when “optimal control” is 
employed. The multipliers derived in this way are then compared to those that can be obtained 
when the “simulation” technique is adopted. This comparison will enable us to argue for the 
superiority of the former. 
The basic problem we are trying to tackle is the following: the policymakers wish to increase 
government expenditure (G) for stabilization purposes. This increase can be financed in two 
alternative ways: through money creation (M) or bond issuance (B). A mixed finance case can, of 
course, be investigated but since the thrust of policy is to be judged via the crowding-out coefficient 
C [equation(l6)], only pure money and bond multipliers will be considered. In either case, though, 
the financing of the increased government expenditure would only be possible if the rate of interest 
(R) changed sufficiently to allow for the required financing. Thus the objective function is defined 
in terms of money or bonds, according to the finance problem, as targets and the rate of interest 
as control. 
The issues can be formally put forward by considering the optimal control problem of minimizing 
the criterion function J with respect to the control vector R, subject to the dynamic non-linear 
econometric model F: 
min {J(B, M, R) 1 F(B, M, Y, R, G, X) = 01, (17) 
where 
R = [R(l),. . . , R(t),. . . , R(T)]‘. 
The variables are defined as follows: B, M and R are the bonds, money and interest rate vectors; 
these variables enter the criterion function and are important in terms of the finance problem as 
stated above. Y is a vector of all the other (except B and M) endogenous variables, G is a vector 
of the scalar G over the time range [l, T] (government expenditure) and X is a vector of all the 
other exogenous variables. 
Next, consider a particular solution (optimal or not) of the econometric model F which serves 
as a benchmark in the finance problems. Call this a base run and denote it with d to indicate that 
the desired values are always the base values in the finance problem 
(Bd, Md, Yd, Rd, Cd, Xd). (18) 
The problem of financing an increase in government expenditure, AC, which brings the level to 
CP, 
GP = Cd + AC, 
is defined as in problem (19) for a quadratic objective function: 
rnin {:[(B - Bd)‘Qs(B - Bd) + (M - Md)‘Qw(M - Md) 
+ (R - Rd)‘QR(R - Rd)] 1 F(B, M, Y, R, G, X) = 0, G = C”) (19) 
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where CID, Q9, and Q, are the penalty matrices in achieving the desired vectors Bd, Md and Rd, 
respectively, with the latter having been set equal to the basic solution (18). 
In essence, what problem (19) entails is calculating the vector R which ensures that either B = Bd 
or M = Md when G = GP, subject to the econometric model F. In other words, problem (19) 
determines the change in the rate of interest required to finance an increase in government 
expenditure. In standard optimal control problems, the penalty matrices are given and they reflect 
the policymaker’s trade-offs between his stated targets. It is obvious, however, that in the finance 
problem considered here, U& or Qsnr should rather be chosen so as to ensure that B = Bd or 
M = Md. In practice, an iterative process is adopted of increasing the penalty weights and 
recalculating problem (19) until B = Bd or M = Md is satisfied exactly. It should be noticed that 
the desired value for the control vector R is also taken to be the value in the basic solution (18). 
The bond-financed case arises as the solution to problem (19) when Qs = 0 and can be represented 
as 
(B*, Md, Y*, R*, GP, Xd), (2Oa) 
where l denotes optimal values. 
This means that in order to finance an increase in government expenditure by AG = GP - Gd, 
new bonds must be issued equal to B* - Bd, which require an increase in the rate of interest equal 
to R* - Rd if money is to remain unchanged at Md. The combined effect of increased government 
expenditure, AG, with a rise in the interest rate by R* - Rd, results in a change in the other 
endogenous variables equal to Y* - Yd. The other exogenous variables remain fixed to their base 
values Xd. 
The money-financed case derives from problem (19) when GM = 0 and is similarly denoted as 
(Bd, M*, Y*, R*, GP, Xd). (20b) 
In this case bonds remain at Bd while money is increased by M* - Md and the interest rate falls 
by R* - Rd which, combined with the increase in G, results in Y* - Yd in the other endogenous 
variables. [We may note in passing that R*,R* will differ in cases (20a) and (20b) above.] 
Optimal government expenditure dynamic multipliers under a particular mode of finance are 
given by the equation 
(21) 
where ) means that the derivative is evaluated at R = R*. Equation (21) can be approximated by 
AY 
AG xzI. = 
AY,, AY,, - . . . - 
AG AG 
AL A& - . . . - 
AG AG 
(22) 
where Axj/AG is a multiplier of target i (i = 1,. . . n) in period j (j = 1,. . . , T) evaluated at R = R*. 
The degree of fiscal stance can now be measured by 
(23) 
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which is an n x T matrix of ratios of bond and money multipliers evaluated at Ry and Rr [which 
are the interest rate values that solve problem (19) under bond and money finance, respectively]. 
The optimal multipliers are distinctly different from those derived using the simulation technique; 
in addition, they are superior to the simulation multipliers, in as much as the latter are biased. 
This could be demonstrated as follows: in the simulation case we have 
where the superscript s denotes the outcome 
or 
H(Bd, M”, Y”, Rd, GP, Xd) = 0 
H(B”, Md, Y’, Rd, GP, Xd) = 0 ’ 
(25) 
AY 
AG ,,cRd = 
L 
AK, AY;, - . . . - 
AG AG 
. 9 
AC, AT,, - . . . - 
AG AG 
for Y when simulating the model under either 
(24) 
It should be stressed that in equations (25) the model H is different from the original model F 
in that B or M is set equal to Bd or Md by exogenizing the equations determining B or M. So, by 
assuming that B = Bd or M = Md can be costlessly achieved, we can then derive the multipliers of 
the simulation approach, as in case (24). However, this implies that simulation multipliers are 
biased; this is so, since by requiring B = Bd or M = Md, the effect on Y, which results from setting 
R = R* is completely ignored. Thus, the exogenization of either bonds or money is done quite 
arbitrarily and without taking into account the costs in terms of adjusting the rate of interest to 
achieve unchanged paths for money or bonds. Clearly, changes in the rate of interest have an 
independent effect on real income, in addition to that which works through money. One can, 
therefore, see that the exogenization of either money or bonds would be of no consequence if 
changes in the rate of interest affect real income only via M or B. In all other cases the simulation 
multipliers will be biased. In fact, one can also detect the direction of the bias. In the money- 
financed case, the interest rate has to fall and consequently simulation fiscal multipliers will be 
downward biased compared with the optimal multipliers. On the other hand, in the bond-financed 
case, the interest rate has to rise and thus simulation multipliers are misleadingly upward estimates 
of the true multipliers. 
This result would still be valid even if the simulations were initiated in a different way which 
would exogenize the money stock and ensure that it remains at its base value while the interest 
rate is still endogenous. This can be shown as follows: consider equations (26) and (27) which 
represent the econometric model-for convenience we set U = R: 
Y = &,R (26) 
and 
M = 8,R + 0,Y. (27) 
The trajectory for the interest rate (R”) for which the money supply would be kept constant at its 
base (Md) is given by solving the reduced form for M, derived from equations (26) and (27): 
R” = (e, + e2e0pMd. 
We wish to show now that R” would still be different to the interest rate trajectory (R*) which 
is obtained through “optimal control”. R* is given by equation (30) via optimizing the objective 
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function (29) subject to (26) and (27): 
J = +[(M - Md)‘Qy(M - Md) + (R - Rd)‘Q,(R - Rd)-J (29) 
and 
R* = [(e, + 82&,)2Q, + Q.-J- ‘[Q,Rd + (0, + 8A$Q,Md]. (30) 
Clearly, R” = R* unless 69, > 0 (i.e. strictly positive definite). Alternatively, R’ = R* if Q, > 0 but 
Rd = 0. However, as is well-known, bond finance implies instrument instability and therefore not 
only Qs. > 0, but also the instrument variation AR has to be included in the objective function with 
high penalty weight (see also Section 3). The condition Rd = 0, if Q > 0, cannot be met because 
the desired path for R must be the base trajectory, for otherwise there would be an incentive to 
change R, in addition to the change required to satisfy the finance problem. 
This is rather important as far as the monetary controversy is concerned because in almost all 
studies where models are used to derive simulation-based fiscal multipliers, these are biased towards 
the no-crowding-out thesis. This result is valid even if the model is monetarist. All that is required 
for this bias to exist is that bond finance must require an increase in the rate of interest, whereas 
money finance, a fall. 
It is important to note that optimal control can also be used to highlight the extent to which 
fiscal policy matters in a much more sophisticated way than the one described by either problem 
(19) or (25). This alternative measure of the thrust of policy consists of examining whether 
government expenditure financed through bonds or money can be used to achieve the desired 
trajectories of some target variables, like inflation and unemployment (see Ref. [I23 for such an 
example). In other words, this approach asks the direct question of whether fiscal policy can be 
used in demand management. The optimal control problem in this case becomes: 
min {J(Y, B, M, G, R) 1 F(B, M, Y, R, G, X) = 0). 
The degree of fiscal stance in this case can be measured by the n x T R* 
The difference between the two approaches [i.e. problems (17) and (31)], is that in the case of 
problem (31) Y and G appear, in addition to B, M and R, in the objective function. In problem 
(17) the problem is simply to track one target (B or M) by using one instrument, R. Roughly 
speaking, the essence in problem (31) is to achieve the desired vector of Y using government 
expenditure as the control while making sure that the rate of interest moves in such a way as to 
insure the finance of the government expenditure. Strictly speaking, however, there is not, in 
principle, a separation in the roles of the two instruments, G and R. Unless the model is so 
constructed, both instruments are chosen so as to minimize J and hence both instruments are 
chosen to achieve, among other things, Y = Yd. But the interpretation given here is roughly true, 
given the usual asymmetry in the effects of the two instruments on Y. 
matrix: 
(31) 
3. EVIDENCE FROM A LARGE-SCALE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In this section we apply the technique of optimal control to derive “optimal-dynamic” fiscal 
policy multipliers which are then compared with “simulation-dynamic” fiscal policy multipliers 
YI 9:2-c 
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derived from the same model-this being the LBS model of the U.K. economy, details of which 
can be found in, for example, Ref. [13]; Arestis and Karakitsos [ 143 provide a succinct mathematical 
version of this model with relevant discussion and here we simply offer a summary of it. Quite 
briefly, this particular model of the U.K. economy belongs to the tradition known in the literature 
as “international monetarism” (Dornbusch [lS] is an early example), although a recognizable 
Keynesian stock is there too in that the determination of output is modelled by aggregating the 
basically demand-determined components of expenditure. There is no explicit specification of the 
supply of output; the supply side is simply portrayed through the pricing equations of the model. 
In fact, it is the specification of the latter, along with the exchange rate and monetary sectors of 
the model, which give the LBS model its “international monetarism” character. Consumers’ 
expenditure is determined by changes in inflation, disposable income and real money supply. A 
real balance effect is thus postulated in this relationship. Investment and stockbuilding are basically 
of the flexible accelerator type with profitability, demand pressures, real bank lending to the private 
sector and real rate of interest being their chief determinants; furthermore, a wealth effect is assumed 
to be prevalent in the stockbuilding equation. An income sector determines among other variables, 
profitability. Government expenditure, on the other hand, is purely exogenous, while taxes are 
made endogenous. The foreign sector assumes an important role where both imports and exports 
are related to an activity variable (world trade for exports, domestic income for imports) and 
relative prices. Export prices are governed by domestic prices, world prices and the exchange rate. 
The latter, along with interest rate differentials, influence capital movements. What is of particular 
interest, however, is the determination of the exchange rate which is hypothesized to be the variable 
that changes appropriately to clear the money market. The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
combined with the quantity theory of money postulates that relative money supplies (U.K. and 
world), given relative incomes and interest rates, determine relative prices and therefore the exchange 
rate. The standard form of the demand for money is adopted, with the money supply being 
endogenous, governed by the interaction of fiscal policy, bank lending to the private sector and 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. The price equation is simply a mark-up relation, while 
the wage equation is modelled in such a way as to capture any disequilibrium in the labour market 
by the deviation of output from its natural level. Finally, the labour supply is exogenized, with the 
demand for labour being treated in a strictly neoclassical manner as a function of the real wage. 
Having summarized the model to be used as our example, we now turn to our basic exercise. 
We wish to calculate two crowding-out coefficients: 
c:=l-~ i=l ,..., T, 
M, 
when the technique of optimal control is employed; and, 
when the simulation technique is utilized. 
Clearly we require 
c: > cf, 
which implies 
This would always be true since K,*, < Kit for, in order to finance an increase in government 
expenditure through borrowing, interest rates must increase in the optimal control case, whilst in 
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the simulation case, no such increase is necessary. The inequality, therefore, holds for given Kz 
and Kh. The latter, however, need not be assumed given for they help to sustain the same inequality. 
It is true that Kz > Kh because, in the money-financed increase in government expenditure, the 
rate of interest decreases when the optimal control is used; in the simulation case, no change in 
the rate of interest is necessary to finance the increased government expenditure. 
When the optimal control technique, as expounded in Section 2, was applied to the LBS modelt 
with the objective function analysed in Table 1, the coefficient C* was obtained and subsequently 
plotted, as in Fig. 1. With the same model, but this time employing the simulation technique, the 
coefficient C” was derived and plotted in Fig. 1 also. The P-coefficient shows that fiscal policy 
matters in this model. This is partly due to the low interest elasticity of the expenditure functions, 
which implies very small cost-of-capital effects, and partly to the absence of any wealth effects in 
the demand for money. However, the C*-coefficient lies above the c-coefficient, a result which 
confirms our claim that the simulation technique is biased towards the no-crowding-out thesis.1 
It should be noticed that the bias is most pronounced during the first eight quarters, which is 
exactly the length of time for which fiscal policy is found as most effective in most empirical studies 
which employ simulation based multipliers. Such studies usually conclude that, since government 
expenditure has strong impact (or first round) effects, in spite of substantial crowding-out arising 
later on, fiscal policy can still be used in demand management. However, this claim seems to be 
unsubstantiated given the time profile of the bias; in addition, whether fiscal policy can be used in 
demand management cannot be answered through simulation-based fiscal multipliers. Rather, this 
question demands a formulation like expression (31). 
0.6 
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Fig. I 
t The same exercise was carried out for the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) model and the 
results were very similar to those reported here for the LBS model. The results are not reported, therefore, in the present 
paper but are available on request from the authors. 
$Crowding-out throughout this paper is judged by the impact of changes in government expenditure, financed 
appropriately, on the level of national income (GDP in fact). 
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One should notice the uneven pattern of the C*-coefficient, unlike the c-coefficient which is 
very smooth. This uneven pattern is due to the behaviour of the rate of interest. At the beginning 
of the optimization period the interest rate effects are more pronounced than later. Recall that 
investment is related to the real rate of interest, not nominal. The implication of this particular 
postulate is that when inflation sets in, the real rate of interest would be lower than otherwise and, 
consequently, the C*-coefficient would be smaller. The rather dramatic reduction in the 
C*-coefficient in the second period can be explained by the lagged wealth effects operating in both 
the consumption and investment/stockbuilding equations. When inflation sets in, these effects 
become very small indeed and, consequently, they stop having any considerable impact, so that 
the behaviour of the C*-coefficient is predominantly governed by the real interest rate.? 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has argued that optimal control is by far superior to policy simulations in problems 
of economic policy. The analysis shows that simulation-based government expenditure multipliers 
are upward biased estimates of the true multipliers. This proposition has been backed up by 
empirical results utilizing a large-scale econometric model of the U.K. economy (the LBS model); 
the empirical results also show that this bias is more pronounced during the first 2 years. 
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tin addition to the information provided in Table 1, the following assumptions were made in the experiments reported 
above: the time horizon is 1981 (2Q)-1986 (1Q); government expenditure refers to “public authority consumption on goods 
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